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Regarding the effectiveness of privatization, two schools of thought are distin-
guished: a school in favor of privatization in general and a school that judges the 
success of privatization to be dependent on the institutional context. This article 
discusses the arguments of both schools and presents a case study on the privatiza-
tion processes that did take place in Kosovo. The Kosovo case is a critical case as 
Kosovo was a post-conflict country with a deplorable institutional setting at the 
time it initiated the privatization processes. If privatization was successful anyway, 
this would make for a strong argument in favor of privatization in general.
The outcomes of the case study show, however, many unintended and negative 
effects of privatization in the Kosovo context. The conclusion, therefore, disputes 
the claim that privatization is beneficial in general, irrespective of the institutional 
setting. Instead, the article makes a plea for creating a favorable institutional setting 
before starting far-reaching transformations through large-scale privatization.
The issues arising from this article are important for policy-makers and in-
ternational missions considering implementing similar programs to other post-
conflict countries.
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1. Introduction
In the economic and public-administration literature, there is a debate on the mer-
its of privatization policies (Lipton and Sachs 1990; Laffont and Tirole 1991; Sti-
glitz 2008; Roland 2008; Savas 2000; Bozeman 2007). On the one hand, neoliberal 
theorists praise privatization and its positive effects on socio-economic develop-
ment in general. They suggest that although employment might first decrease, it 
will eventually increase after the necessary adjustments have been made by the new 
management. Then, privatization will attract foreign investments that in their turn 
will further contribute to economic and social developments and the improvement 
of local entrepreneurship. On the other hand, institutional and regulation schools 
of thought suggest that in order for this model to work, strong institutions are cru-
cial (North 1991) and that adaptation of privatization models to the specifics of 
the context of the country is needed. Their idea is that only then the model can be 
effectively implemented.
In post-communist societies, privatization processes were conceived to be, at 
least at the start, the ultimate action towards growth and development, and a break 
from the past (Hanley and Dawson 2016). Sometimes such attempts did have the 
promised results, at other times they did not (cf. Dan and Pollitt 2015; Drechsler 
and Randma-Liiv 2015). Given the economic debate on privatization, one of the 
reasons for this varying success could be the starting position regarding the strength 
of government and the public institutions in a country.
This article assesses the effects of the privatization processes in Kosovo be-
tween 1999 and 2008. The reforms in Kosovo started in 1999 under the influence of 
international missions. Because of the weakness of the Kosovo Provisional Institu-
tions of Self-Government, one of the main objectives of this international mission 
was to privatize all those service delivery agencies the public sector seemed unable 
to manage. Privatization generally involves a decrease of state participation in an 
enterprise or service (Wright 1993). The case of privatization in Kosovo is an ex-
treme case, because of the extreme weakness of public institutions in this country 
and its starting position. Kosovo went through a war which ended in 1999 with 
NATO intervention and the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), aiming primarily at “State building and the establishment of self-man-
aged institutions” (Knudsen 2010).
That background enables us to use the case of Kosovo to answer the main re-
search question of this article: What were the effects of the privatization processes 
in Kosovo in terms of governance, employment and social well-being in Kosovo ? 
Alongside answering this question this paper also addresses what this answer im-
plies for the two contesting theories about privatization. This relates to the idea 
that privatization is beneficial in general and also that its success depends on the 
existence of strong institutions.
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In order to answer the research question we first present the theories on the 
impact of the institutional setting on privatization. Subsequently we give an over-
view of the weak institutional setting in Kosovo at the start of the privatization pro-
cess in 1999. Then we assess the privatization process in this fragile state, and finally 
we give an assessment of the effects thereof.
This case study is based on document analysis, reports of local research insti-
tutions, available data produced by institutions within Kosovo (including the Koso-
vo Trust Agency-KTA), by international institutions such as the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), and also with the assistance of semi-structured interviews with 
local experts. We searched for literature on the reasons for privatization as used in 
Kosovo within the context of privatization processes in Central and Eastern Europe 
during the time of transformation in the 1990s. This allows us to understand the 
conception of the model used in this part of Europe. We consulted publications that 
analyze the privatization process in the Balkan region with a special focus on the 
case of Kosovo and, if possible in relation to the international administration man-
agement of the process. Additionally, we sought for opinions on privatization of 
representatives of the institutions involved in the process, such as the Trust Agency 
of Kosovo (which in 2008 became the Privatization Agency of Kosovo), the govern-
ment, the UN mission, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Their 
reports as well as local independent research contributions were reviewed. Further-
more, semi-structured interviews with actors directly or indirectly involved in the 
process of privatization (including representatives from the government3, the IMF, 
local institutes and managers of a privatized enterprise etc.) complete the picture.
The topic is not only relevant for Kosovo, but could have wider implications, 
since privatization is pursued by and imposed on many countries irrespective of 
the strength of the institutional setting. Therefore, it might be crucial to understand 
whether countries that lack proper institutions can successfully go through such 
kinds of processes or whether the implementation of such processes in such coun-
tries is likely to result in unexpected and harmful side effects.
2. Two views on privatization
History knows many eras in which processes of privatization, by which govern-
mental organizations transfer tasks and responsibilities to the private sector, be-
came popular (Nemec and de Vries 2015). The last upheaval of such practices 
started in the UK and USA under Thatcher and Reagan, respectively. In the UK 
it involved, for instance, the privatization of British Petroleum in 1979, followed 
in the 1980s by British Aerospace, Amersham International, the National Freight 
Company, Britoil, British Ports, Jaguar Cars, British Telecom and British Airways 
(cf. Nemec and de Vries 2015).
3 For personal safety and fear of reprisals, they have preferred to stay anonymous.
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Such privatization was the preferred policy within Neo-liberal theories, as 
privatization results in the disappearance of state monopolies and the creation of a 
large number of private competitors that compete and thus create a market based 
on demand and supply, which is assumed to be favorable for the population (La-
baronne 2001). The idea is that such a transfer of state monopolies suffices to create 
an environment favorable to competition, consequently having a positive impact 
on consumption, employment, growth etc. Privatization is seen as a way to replace 
the dominance of decisions by planned economy hierarchy into a dominance of 
decisions made by private agents based on the incentive that being responsive to 
market signals results in maximizing profit (Harvylyshyn and McGettigan 1999). In 
this ideological point of view, the liberal dogma has been welcomed in CEE coun-
tries after the transition, as communism had shown its limitations for more than 
forty years (Kornai 1999). Economists leading the IMF or World Bank’s missions 
in countries in Central and Eastern Europe brought the dogmas to these countries 
and tried to implement them as such. This neo-liberal view was also reflected in 
the theory on New Public Management, favoring a mixture of the delivery triad 
of privatization, contracting-out and public-private partnerships (Drechsler and 
Randma-Liiv 2015). However, it was not only ideology. There are also several well-
known theories supportive of privatization.
In the school of Property Rights, private management is considered to be su-
perior to public property, because private management is driven by profit maximi-
zation and is more inclined to work on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the enterprise. This is not the case for a public manager, as this official is not profit-
oriented (Bayliss 2005). Based on the work of Ronald Coase and Harold Demsetz, 
Starr (1988) argued that individuals tend to abuse and ultimately destroy what is 
public, but tend to take good care of their own private property. The idea is, for 
instance, that because of soft-budget constraints, the near-impossibility of public 
bankruptcy, the almost unconditional financial support from the State, in public 
enterprises, management is not inclined to make serious efforts to control the pro-
cess of production and to eliminate potential waste (waste of time, raw materials 
etc.) (Kornai 1986).
Public-choice theorists argue that politicians and bureaucrats make decisions 
based on the effects thereof for their political careers (Wright 1993). Politicians and 
bureaucrats controlling public-service delivery will deliver excessive public services 
in order to satisfy particular groups of interest who will in return help them to 
get re-elected (Bel and Warner 2006). This theory promotes the notion that private 
property would help to internalize the externalities and, therefore, would better en-
sure the optimal allocation of resources and the effectiveness of the free market.
From a principal-agent theoretical standpoint, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that from the moment management and ownership are separated, an agen-
cy relation is created with a principal and an agent. This implies that the principal 
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delegates decision-making to the agent. Whether this is advantageous depends, 
among other things, on the information asymmetry between principal and agent. 
Jensen and Meckling argue that the public sector is much more subject to such in-
formation asymmetry. This is the case, because the complexity of responsibilities 
of different ministries and public agencies creates an environment that encour-
ages such information asymmetry with the consequence that public managers 
are in a better position to act in a way that is suitable for their own profit, irre-
spective of whether it is advantageous for the principal (politicians and public). 
Accordingly, it is more likely in the public sector that a manager will first seek to 
satisfy his / her own interest and will try to improve his / her own situation instead 
of acting in accordance to the interests of the principals. Jensen and Meckling 
judge this to be less likely in the private sector, because even if the manager hides 
information from shareholders, the market will eventually regulate this behavior 
through changing demand and falling stock prices of shares, immediately having 
consequences for the position of the manager.
Contrary to these “one-size-fits-all” theories promoting privatization in gen-
eral, the perspective of neo-institutional theories is that privatization can be sup-
ported, but only after strong institutions have emerged. In this theory, the neo-liber-
al theories are criticized for their neglect thereof. Already at the time of transition in 
CEE countries, it was argued that such practices were doomed to fail, because they 
did not take into consideration that the institutional framework in CEE-countries 
was fragile and that these countries needed gradual reforms, strong institutions and 
regulators (Tirole 1991). North (1991) argued that economic performance depends 
ultimately on a strong institutional framework. To quote from his speech while re-
ceiving the Nobel Prize in 1993:
It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforce-
ment characteristics that shapes economic performance. While 
the rules may be changed overnight, the informal norms usually 
change only gradually. Since it is the norms that provide ‘legiti-
macy’ to a set of rules, revolutionary change is never as revolu-
tionary as its supporter’s desire and performance will be different 
than anticipated. And economies that adopt the formal rules of 
another economy will have very different performance character-
istics than the first economy because of different informal norms 
and enforcement (North 2014, para. 42).
The implication is that transferring the formal political and economic rules 
of successful Western market economies to Third World and Eastern European 
economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic performance according 
to these theorists. Privatization is not a panacea for solving poor economic perfor-
mance. The institutional mainstream recommends a gradual process of privatiza-
tion, which, in other terms, is easily managed, controlled and, if needed, modified. 
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Institutions will frame the process and ensure its effectiveness. In addition, when 
necessary, institutions may correct, avoid or take measures against issues such as 
corruption, mismanagement etc.
The 2014 Nobel Prize winner, Tirole (1991), defends the idea of creating an 
appropriate environment, which helps creating a free market. Indeed, he argues that 
it is necessary to create an environment where there is no pure monopoly, but rather 
competition. He argues that:
since at least Montesquieu and the American Federalists, it has 
been well understood that strong safeguards must be put in place 
to prevent governments from serving the interests of specific 
groups. Many of these safeguards did not exist under the previous 
regimes and will take time to install: organization and rotation in 
the civil service, administrative procedures and regulatory hear-
ings, independent administrative courts, checks and balances in 
government, development of a tradition of investigative reporting 
by the media, etc. (Tirole 1991, 240).
While praising privatization, Tirole points out that it is crucial to have a clear 
timetable, with well-defined steps, and, above all, strong regulatory bodies. He also 
insists on tailored policy recommendations; tailored to the industrial and political 
realities and specifics of each country. It is for such reasons that, among others, Sti-
glitz (Komisar 2011) reinforces the idea that international institutions such as the 
IMF and the WB, instead of asking for deregulation, should help countries develop 
what he calls “the right regulatory structure”.
Numerous prerequisites for successful privatization are mentioned in the lit-
erature. They involve good governance and strong governmental oversight through 
valid performance indicators. They also include principles of democratic legitima-
cy, transparent public accountability, a normative role of the legislative, an adequate 
conceptual framework, an unequivocal decision framework, uniform regulations 
and a single ministry to take the lead. At the operational level it is deemed necessary 
to have adequate steering instruments and the capacity to evaluate such processes, 
weighing public interests against individual interests, arranging accountability, as 
well as possibilities for citizens to make complaints (cf. Nemec and de Vries 2015).
The above makes it clear that contesting views exist regarding the general ben-
efits of privatization and the dependence of its success on contextual features.
3. Privatization in Kosovo
This section describes the privatization processes that occurred in Kosovo between 
1999 and 2009. First, we present the context in which these processes took place. 
This will show that Kosovo lacked an adequate institutional setting. This part of the 
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analysis argues that the case of Kosovo is a critical case. If privatization processes 
work out even under the circumstances as witnessed in Kosovo, this would be a 
strong argument in favor of theories promoting privatization in general.
Next, we present the actual privatization processes that took place in Kosovo, 
and in the third subsection we assess the effects thereof. The outcomes will consti-
tute the empirical basis for the argumentation whether the claim made by theorists 
being in favor of privatization in general is indeed valid.
3.1 The context
The Balkan region is well-known for its complex history, which has always been 
characterized by hostile relations between and within the countries involved. A 
brief historical background of this context is needed in order to understand the 
privatization processes in this region.
In 1945, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), under the com-
mandment of Tito, was a socialist country. From the 1960s onwards, a process start-
ed to grant larger autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina within the Federation, which 
was also explicitly stated in the Constitution of 1974. Pavlovic (2013) describes the 
changes that the constitution brought to the situation of Kosovo within SFRY:
The process of reorganizing the Yugoslav federation, which start-
ed in the late 1960s, reached its climax in the 1974 constitution. 
For the first time, republics and even the autonomous provinces 
of Vojvodina and Kosovo had their own constitutions. … Accord-
ing to the constitution, the Assembly of Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo had the power to change the constitution of 
SAP Kosovo, had a vote in the event of changes to the federal 
constitution or to the constitution of Serbia, and had the power 
to decide on other crucial questions regarding the political, social, 
and cultural development of the region. It also had the power to 
issue laws and budgets, to appoint and recall the president and 
the members of the executive council of the SAP Kosovo Assem-
bly, the judges of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, the judges 
of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, secretaries of the region, and 
other officials in Kosovo institutions. It controlled the executive 
council and other administration bodies of the province (Pav-
lovic 2013, para. 1 and 3).
The new constitution not only brought about an important advancement in 
terms of democracy, it also contributed to softening the economic policy and gave 
more liberty to local entrepreneurship and to the employees of the until then public 
enterprises by creating so-called “socially-owned enterprises” (Garde 2000; Bros-
sard and Vidal 2001).
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The “socially-owned enterprises” regrouped different branch enterprises 
and public services: agricultural cooperatives, veterinary clinics, municipal public 
transports, industrial enterprises etc. and were steered by a Directorate General and 
the “workers’ council”. Theoretically, the latter had the capacity to veto the decisions 
of the Directorate General. Specialized entities of the enterprise fixed the objectives 
of the organization and were sent for approval to the Workers’ Council. However, 
the real ownership remained “undefined and unidentifiable” within the Yugoslavian 
legislation (Knudsen 2010).
With the “announced” fall of communism, Slobodan Milosevic took over the 
leadership of the Communist Party in Serbia, concentrated power and annulled 
the previously granted autonomy of Kosovo. On 28 March 1989, he was able to 
abolish Kosovo’s autonomy completely. In parallel with the changes of the political 
spectrum in Yugoslavia, Milosevic also changed the economic policies (Castellan 
1994; Brossard and Vidal 2001). With so-called compulsory / emergency measures 
(the decree of 23 March 1989), three policies were introduced: 1) the firing of the 
majority of Albanian public servants and workers of the Socially Owned and Public 
Enterprises, 2) the transformation of all socially-owned enterprises into public en-
terprises administered by his loyalists sent from Belgrade, 3) transference of prop-
erty rights of SOEs in Kosovo to Serbian public enterprises (Malcolm 1998).
The case of Trepça – the largest mining complex of ex-Yugoslavia – illustrates 
the situation. After having fired all Albanian managers and the majority of Alba-
nian employees, Milosevic appointed his loyalists as directors of the company and 
replaced the Albanian workers with workers from Serbia and Serbs from Bosnia 
(leaving the country because of the war). Afterwards, the regime transformed the 
company into a shareholding company controlled by public enterprises from Serbia.
The prospects for Trepça worsened when the United Nations put an embargo 
on Serbia for its implication in the Bosnian war. During the 1990s, the Serbian ad-
ministration and public enterprises started privatizing several enterprises. Howev-
er, with the deterioration of the Balkan conflict into a full-fledged war, this process 
was abandoned. One of the consequences was that the unfinished process created 
additional ambiguity about property rights and ownership of enterprises in Kosovo. 
This is also seen in the case of Trepça, where the government was unable to priva-
tize the enterprise for political reasons, but also because of “complaints from inves-
tors who claim to have bought the company during the era of Milosevic” (Knudsen 
2010).
After Kosovo had gone through a decade of violence and a war, the situa-
tion stabilized in 1999 with the intervention of NATO and the establishment of a 
UN mission having as a specific assignment “peacebuilding and state-building” in 
Kosovo. The country was devastated, institutions destroyed, the archives taken to 
Serbia and chaos and disorder reigning all over. The main goal of the UN mission 
was to remedy these issues.
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A Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) became de fac-
to and de jure the highest authority in the country. The UN mission, under the lead-
ership of the SRSG, took control of local governments, courts and national institu-
tions. In parallel, it created provisional institutions of self-government that were, 
however, in practice hardly self-governed, since each decision had to be approved 
by the UNMIK representatives at their different levels. In the aftermath of the war, 
as of 1999, newly created institutions lacked qualified personnel and infrastructure, 
despite the fact that Kosovars had built parallel institutions without having highly 
qualified human resources and adequate infrastructure (schools, universities held 
their courses in private houses etc.) and international missions brought assistance 
in capacity building, especially in fields that needed technical skills. The situation 
proved to be especially complicated in areas requiring highly educated personnel. 
Also, the judiciary system, the police, the customs, local-government institutions 
and national agencies needed to be restructured or newly created.
The SRSG and the UN team decided that such state-building could only be 
successful if it went hand in hand with economic development in which privatiza-
tion had to be the core policy. As Knudsen (2010) noted:
Economic reconstruction and development, the responsibility of 
the EU-led pillar in Kosovo, was a daunting task at the start of 
the international state-building project. … International officials 
quickly made it clear that large-scale privatization of Kosovo’s 
enterprises would be the main economic strategy of the state-
building operation (Knudsen 2010, 12).
Table 1
Administrative and institutional situation before prerequisites –  
A comparative view on CEE countries and Kosovo
CEE countries Kosovo
Relatively strong central and local 
institutions
Relatively strong education system – 
inclusive
Relatively strong judicial system (courts, 
contracts)
Strong police and customs services
An administrative culture (although 
bureaucratic)
A clear perspective to join NATO and the EU
Remaining dominance of national 
government
Provisional institutions for self-governance
Weak education – exclusive during the 
1990s
Weak judicial system in need for 
reconstruction
Newly created institutions in police, 
customs, statistics, and tax administration
Lack of administrative culture
Ten years of isolation had destroyed trust in 
government
Government was taken over by the 
international mission
An overview of what was present in those other CEE countries, but absent or 
in some cases newly created, in Kosovo is summarized below in Table 1. The table 
shows that basic institutions were not present in Kosovo. Most important was that 
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the legal framework was not yet finalized in 1999. In a report published in 2008, 
the OSCE pointed out difficult legislative issues with regard to the functioning of 
KTA, to the Special Chamber and the legislation that was used in the process of 
privatization.
We will assess the public-sector reforms and more specifically the privatiza-
tion against this complex contextual background.
3.2 The process of privatization in Kosovo
How did the process of privatization in Kosovo start and how was it conducted 
by the UN administration and others institutions in charge ? After the Balkan war 
ended, international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, the Eu-
ropean Commission and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pub-
lished several reports and organized numerous conferences in which the process 
of privatization was argued to be only beneficial for Kosovo. In 2001, the World 
Bank emphasized the importance of reinforcing the private sector and liberalizing 
the economy by urging for “the adoption of clear governance policies as well as 
policies facilitating the transition to a private market based economy” (World Bank 
2001a, 2). In another report, the World Bank (2001b) took a clear position in favor 
of privatization and encouraged the UNMIK to proceed as soon as possible with the 
creation of necessary institutions.
Next to the more general arguments in favor of privatization, as already men-
tioned above, specific arguments for Kosovo were also given. First of all, there were 
the financial incentives of privatization, namely, providing the State with the much 
needed revenues, bringing in foreign currency by attracting Foreign Direct Invest-
ments and putting an end to the expensive subsidies to public enterprises. Secondly, 
there were economic arguments pointing to the need to improve economic effec-
tiveness and to maximize the profit of enterprises and to facilitate macro-economic 
stability. Thirdly, there were arguments pointing out that privatization would restore 
property to former owners, privilege company employees, distribute state property 
to the entire population, reduce the power and pressure of unions and elaborate a 
kind of new social contract. Fourthly, there were political arguments, saying that 
privatization would push out the hated “nomenklatura”, would minimize the influ-
ence of the State and would consolidate democracy by introducing popular (mass) 
shareholding. Last but not least, the arguments in favor of privatization were also 
ideological, namely to create an irreversible situation in favor of free markets and to 
demonstrate “the superiority” of private property (cf. Labaronne 1999).
It is therefore not surprising that already in 1999, the European Commission, 
together with the World Bank, stimulated the UNMIK to proceed with privatization 
(European Commission and the World Bank 1999). Most arguments used consisted 
of pointing out that the socially owned enterprises were in bad shape and needed 
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investments which could only be provided by private owners (i.e. FDIs, employ-
ment and social welfare).
Notwithstanding all this pressure to proceed with privatization, the process 
did encounter several issues. The first problem was how to deal with the complicat-
ed issue of liability and undefined ownership over the Socially Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and land properties. Because of Serbian claims of ownership over all Kosovo 
assets, at first several investigations were conducted, mainly in order to find a way to 
proceed with mass privatization without getting in a liability contest situation and 
without being “suable”. In respect of this point, Knudsen (2010) argues that:
Belgrade’s insistence on ownership of all publicly and socially 
owned property in Kosovo increased the nervousness among the 
international officials as to future problems, should they be found 
to have exceeded their mandate when privatizing. … Legal con-
cerns, however, troubled the international state builders, particu-
larly the undefined issue of who owned Kosovo’s enterprises, and 
how international officials could avoid liability when privatizing 
them (Knudsen 2010, p. 38).
Upon the request of UNMIK, the IMF and other international institutions 
assisted the mission in the process of institution-building and economic policy 
implementation (Demekas et al. 2002). The IMF considered that compared to the 
status quo at the time, any other solution was better than the status quo. Hence, it 
supported the decision to continue with privatization, although being aware of the 
legal issues implied by the process (A. Domi, personal communication, 11 Febru-
ary 2010; Economists of Government, personal communication, 8 February 2010).
In all cases, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) started 
planning privatization by combining several models of privatization that had also 
been used in other CEE countries, notwithstanding the differences between the 
starting position of Kosovo compared to those CEE countries. As mentioned above, 
institutions, such as administrative courts, regulatory bodies, an administrative cul-
ture etc., able to steer the transformation were present in other CEE countries, but 
not so in Kosovo.
Nonetheless, the authority of the SRSG, combined with the influence of 
Western embassies and other international missions (IMF, WB, EU mission etc.), 
were “rock-solid” in their decision to impose the model of privatization in Kosovo 
(Knudsen 2010; Musliu, personal communication, 4 April 2015).
In June 2002, the part of UNMIK in charge of Reconstruction and Economic 
Development, managed by the European Union (EU), launched the creation of the 
Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) (UNMIK regulation 2002 / 12). The “creators” of KTA 
describe it as follows:
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The KTA has been established to preserve or enhance the value, 
viability, and corporate governance of socially owned and public 
enterprises in Kosovo. For Socially Owned Enterprises the KTA 
initiates ‘Spin-offs’ and Liquidation, its preferred procedures for 
privatization. The Regulations establishing the KTA were pro-
mulgated on 13th June 2002 (http://kta-kosovo.org/html/index.
php).
In addition, from June 2002 to May 2003, the mission and the self-governed 
institutions approved other regulations and basic legislation to proceed with priva-
tization, including the creation of a Special Chamber which had, among others, the 
exclusive jurisdiction for all suits against the Agency (KTA n.d.). It created a Board 
of directors to manage KTA, which was composed of four international directors 
(one of them being the Managing Director of the Agency and three Deputy SRSG) 
and four Kosovars (three ministers and the President of Trade Unions) (UNMIK 
Regulation 2002 / 12; Knudsen 2010). The daily work was done by a mixed team of 
internationals and local experts.
On 15 May 2003, KTA decided to start the privatization of socially-owned en-
terprises. At the time, the Board of Directors decided to proceed with full privatiza-
tion and did not follow the examples of other countries where the enterprises were 
sold by shares, i.e. individuals could buy shares of an enterprise x or y. In Kosovo, 
the KTA decided to sell complete firms by tender. Although three specific methods 
were used – Regular Spin-off (the highest bid) (KTA, n.d.), Special Spin-off (priva-
tization with specific conditions, mainly in the field of operation, investment and 
employment) and Liquidation, the idea in all three models is similar, namely to have 
a complete transfer of the ownership of enterprises to one new owner.
As for the profits of these privatizations and the question how these should 
be divided, the agency decided that “the closest” owners of these organizations 
were the former employees. Hence, it was decided that 20 % of the revenues of the 
privatized organization would go to these former workers. Taking the complexity of 
property rights into consideration, the Agency published open calls for claims for 
each enterprise that was going through the process of privatization.
In Table 2, it is seen that seven organizations were to be sold, on which the 
agency received 17 bids, however at prices that barely reached half of the real value 
of the companies. The seven companies include companies that produced compart-
ments for energy production, heating systems, engineering and construction, lime-
stone extraction etc. The table also shows that the difference between the value of 
the company and the money involved in the transfer is unrelated to the number of 
acceptable bids. The company with the most bids (Energo Invest) had five bids, but 
was privatized at a price of less than one-third of its value, while Termosistem had 
only one interested party, but was sold at the price of its real value.
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Table 2
The first wave of privatization
New Cos Acceptable bids
Value of the 
company (in 
1,000s of €)
Value of the accepted 
offer company (in 
1,000s of €)
Energo Invest (Assembly) 5 2,354 750
Energo Invest (Fuses) 4 1,866 525
Lepenci 3 650 650
Montage Kosovo 3 600 210
Përparimi 3 3,573 2,298
Termosistem 1 200 200
Ringov 0 – –
Total 17 9,245 4,634
Source: Mustafa et al. 2008
Socially owned enterprises (SOE) were privatized in a regrouped manner, i.e. 
in what the KTA called “a wave”. Hence, each wave regrouped a certain number 
of SOEs, the latter being regrouped not in function of the branch of activity, but 
in function of their ability to be sold, in function of internal logic and operational 
modes of the KTA. According to Dobruna (2007), in the first 22 waves of privatiza-
tion, a total amount of 332 million Euros was involved. Out of this, local investors 
invested 139 M€ (42 %), followed by international investors for an amount of 80 M€, 
financial institutions (Western bank branches in Kosovo) for 78 M€ and finally the 
Kosovar diaspora living in Western Europe and the United States, who invested 34 
M€ (10 %). Around 76 M€ was distributed to former employees, and the remain-
der of the revenues was placed at the Central Bank of Kosovo, which, under the 
leadership of UNMIK administrators, decided to place the privatization funds at 
European banks (Gerxhaliu, personal communication, 12 February 2010). Between 
2003 and 2014, it is estimated that privatization in Kosovo has generated a total 
revenue of 660 M€ (PAK 2015).
From its beginning, the process was several times interrupted because of ques-
tions regarding the legal framework, issues of political decisions etc. As explained 
earlier, the issue of whether documents issued during the 1990s by the regime of 
Milosevic could be seen as valid forced the KTA to stop the process several times 
as external parties sued the KTA for having privatized their properties and not hav-
ing considered such documentation. Despite these interruptions, KTA continued 
the waves of privatization until its transformation into the Privatization Agency of 
Kosovo in 2008 (PAK 2009). Sometimes the process failed, as was the case with the 
Post and Telecom of Kosovo (PTK). Opposition in parliament blocked this priva-
tization, as it judged the PTK value to be under-evaluated by the bidder and the 
government, because of its potential for corruption, and because they feared the 
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deal would have negative impacts on the economy and the employment. The case is 
now subject to international arbitration (TopChannel 2015).
Although the PTK case suggests that the privatization was well thought-
through, in all cases suspicious deals were sealed with “important organizations for 
the country” having been sold for symbolic amounts. Ferronikel, a giant producer 
of nickel, was sold for a minimal sum of 32 million euros; and the electricity dis-
tribution network for only 26 million euros, whereas comparable networks were 
sold in Montenegro, in Macedonia and Albania for several hundreds of millions. 
Thousands of hectares of agricultural land were privatized and transformed into 
real estate below their real value.
Ferronikel went through a special spin-off privatization, i.e. with specific em-
ployment and investment conditions. However, in order to seal this privatization, 
the buyer negotiated a fixed price for electricity, which covers half of the production 
cost (Knudsen 2010). This implies that this contract severely damages the profit-
ability of the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK), a State-Owned company man-
aged by KTA, as Ferronikel consumes around 10 % of the electricity of the country 
(Knudsen 2010).
Financial issues are not the only ones at stake. Ferronikel produces nickel. 
The production thereof requires the filtering of evaporating rests, because they may 
be toxic and even very carcinogenic (KFOS 2012). However, Ferronikel produced 
nickel for several years without using filters and because proper judicial institutions 
are lacking, environmental and health issues have become a serious challenge for 
the population. Cancer has exploded in Kosovo and particularly in the areas near 
the Ferronikel production site.
Notwithstanding these issues, the UN administration was successful in its ba-
sic mission, namely to conduct the process of privatization. But the success came at 
a cost. The next subsection will address the main effects seen twelve years after the 
start of the process of the privatization.
3.3 The effects of the privatizations
Did the privatizations improve the economic environment and produce positive 
results in terms of governance, employment and social well-being in Kosovo ? This 
section addresses that question and gives evidence that allows us to draw provi-
sional conclusions on socio-economic development.
The academic discussion so far has been fixed predominantly at giving ar-
guments in favor of privatization, based on the supremacy of private ownership 
and the positive effects of market economy. The interviewed Kosovo economists 
and IMF official also strongly supported privatization. They affirmed that for the 
Kosovo government, this was a method to “get rid of ” public and socially owned 
enterprises in which one could not invest, to get the much needed finances and in 
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the end to induce change and a better life (Ahmeti 2010, personal communication, 
5 February 2010).
However, as we described in the previous subsection, the finances government 
received for the privatized companies were much lower than their real value. Fur-
thermore, in society, the process was accompanied by important economic and so-
cial suffering. Unemployment is still exceptionally high, namely a 35.3 % of the ac-
tive population in 2014 (Trading Economics 2016). Youth unemployment (15 – 24) 
is around 60.2 % (http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/countryinfo/). 
This issue represents a challenge for society as Kosovo’s population is the young-
est in Europe, with more than 50 % of the population being between 15 and 30 
years old, and each year between 30,000 and 50,000 students graduate from higher-
education institutions. The labor market is unable to create jobs for such a high 
number of new entrants, and unemployment continues its rising trend (IMF 2013; 
KAS 2014a).
The third unintended outcome is that the trade balance is extremely unbal-
anced in favor of imports of about 2.2 billion Euros for 2014 (2.5 B€ concern the 
imports and 0.3 B€ the exports (MTI 2015). More specific for the privatized com-
panies is that around 30 % thereof are now out of function / off the market (Mustafa 
et al. 2008) and an equal percentage of owners have rented out the real estate or 
workplace they previously bought. In other CEE countries, international investors 
expressed a great interest in buying themselves in, but in Kosovo international in-
vestors did not show a great interest in shares of the privatized companies. The 
reason most often mentioned is Kosovo’s unstable political status, issues around 
ambiguous ownership and the lack of an institutional framework including a strong 
judicial system (Kullashi et al. 2005).
Privatization also did not reduce corruption. Corruption and inequalities have 
reached unprecedented levels. Data from the World Governance Indicators point 
out that Kosovo scores much worse than other European and Central Asian coun-
tries on indicators for good governance, such as voice and accountability, govern-
ment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and the control of corruption. 
With regard to all six indicators for good governance, Kosovo belongs to the lower 
half of all countries in the world, and the situation has not improved between 2008 
and 2014 (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home).
Although such statistics are not fully reliable, the indicators are supported by 
the managers of privatized enterprises. In 2008, 82 % of them considered corrup-
tion to be widespread in Kosovo (Mustafa et al. 2008). The justice system is consid-
ered to be too weak, albeit strongly controlled by the UN until 2008 and then by 
the EU. The majority of Kosovo citizens also consider local judges to be corrupted 
and that claimants hardly had a chance to have their affairs be addressed properly. 
Consequently, trust in public institutions is low, resulting in turnouts at elections of 
less than 50 % of the population. New populist parties have emerged, building their 
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political program around the rejection of the views of the traditional parties and 
of the international mission. These are considered to be corrupt, untouchable and 
harmful to society.
Furthermore, there are many serious issues regarding the daily life of Kosovo 
citizens and basic public-service delivery, including healthcare, quality education 
and social security. The bad shape of all these policy areas have pushed a high num-
ber of them to migrate to Western Europe and seek for a better life (cf. Gerxhaliu, 
personal communication, 12 February 2010, Musliu, personal communication, 4 
April 2015). Although these are general economic developments which cannot all 
be blamed on the process towards privatization, they do show that the dominant 
economic policy of privatization did not have any positive effects in this regard.
More specific effects of privatization are pointed out by Musliu (personal com-
munication, 4 April 2015). In this communication, Musliu concluded that the priva-
tization has been subject to an enormous mismanagement (bureaucratic decisions, 
political interferences, issues with property rights even after the companies were 
privatized etc.). This is a surprising assessment for a mission that wanted to create 
an independent agency. The management of KTA was appointed by and account-
able to the SRSG (Ante 2010). Four members of the Board of KTA were members of 
the team of SRSG, acting out of the position of Deputy SRSGs (Knudsen 2010). This 
situation raises questions about the responsibility and accountability of the agency’s 
leadership. In addition to a limited term of office, the leadership of the mission 
and agency benefited from total immunity. With the benefit of hindsight one can 
conclude that this enabled them to manage the process in a way favoring their own 
personal interest instead of the common interest. Although it has not been proven 
that UN agents were involved in corruption affairs or were aware of corruption af-
fairs during the process, the process has been accompanied by suspicious affairs of 
corruption, abuse of information and power (Ahmeti 2010, personal communica-
tion, 5 February 2010). Peterson (2014) argues that:
Both the international community as well as domestic actors 
have used the process to further their own aims in the territory, 
preventing the potential of privatization to be used effectively – 
to positively transform economic relationships (Peterson 2014, 
135).
Next, if privatization was meant to end state monopolies, in fact it just trans-
formed them into private monopolies. Privatization in Kosovo has helped the estab-
lishment of a few giant companies that have close ties with politicians and control 
large sectors of the economy (Gerxhaliu, personal communication, 12 February 
2010). The assumption that privatization would bring an end to state monopo-
lies, ensure competition and liberalize the market has not been realized in Kosovo. 
There is still no competitive market, but rather a market full of private monopolies 
controlled indirectly by representatives of the dominating political parties.
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Privatization also did not prevent inequalities and can even be said to have 
contributed to the concentration of wealth in the hands of small groups (cf. Starr 
1988). In 2011, general poverty affected 29.7 % of the population with 10.2 % be-
ing in extreme poverty (KAS 2014b, http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/
home/countryinfo/). In 2010, the Japan International Cooperation Agency estimat-
ed that between 2002 and 2005 the Gini index increased from 0.27 to 0.30, although 
specifying that the data is not fully reliable (JICA 2010). This is relatively high from 
a European perspective.
Our interviews with economists of the Macroeconomic department under the 
Prime Minister of Kosovo also show that they evaluate the process as “not totally 
successful”, which is a diplomatic response. According to them the privatization 
was a policy to disengage the State and, more importantly, to avoid any further 
use of public and state-owned enterprises by politicians as political and campaign 
instruments. However, the privatized companies seem to be as strongly related to 
politicians and political parties as the public enterprises once were. The main differ-
ence is that because it concerns privatized companies, the institutional checks and 
balances occur even less.
4. Conclusions
This article assessed the effects of the privatization processes in Kosovo between 
1999 and 2008, during which a UN mandate governed Kosovo (Lemay-Hébert and 
Murshed 2016).
The research question underlying this article reads: “What were the effects 
of the privatization processes in Kosovo in terms of governance, employment and 
social well-being ?” The privatization in Kosovo between 1999 and 2008 can be seen 
as an extreme case, as strong institutions in the country were severely missing and 
the country was governed by a UN mandate.
The case study points out that the privatization processes did not bring about 
the positive effects expected from such a policy. Overall, it cannot but be concluded 
that privatization in Kosovo was an experience with only negative effects. Privati-
zation did not ameliorate the employment rate in Kosovo. On the contrary, twelve 
years after the start of the privatization process, employment seems to have con-
stantly decreased, and the U-shape tendencies with regard to employment, which 
some economists propagating privatization have predicted, have not been visible in 
Kosovo (i.e. after privatization, an important decrease of employment followed by a 
significant improvement).
The expected economic and social development, as argued by orthodox theo-
ries and the international administration that drove the process, has also not been 
achieved. Nowadays poverty affects one-third of Kosovo’s population. Increasing 
inequalities are visible and continue to increase. Unemployment is extraordinarily 
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high, and there are signs of self-enrichment of politicians and unfulfilled campaign 
promises that discourage citizens from participating in the democratic process. 
Trust in public institutions is consequently low.
It appears that the basic cause for the disappointing effects is the one-sided 
focus on privatization without first creating the needed conditions, institutions and 
legislative framework able to steer the process and have it accompanied with checks 
and balances. Instead, the process was mismanaged, conducted without clear objec-
tives and planned without the needed checks and balances being in order.
In conclusion, this article argues that privatization processes are in need of a 
supportive socio-economic, political and institutional context and that the interna-
tional privatization model implemented in Kosovo neglected the absent institution-
al context and the country’s poor socio-economic and political situation. The lack 
of appropriate institutions, of a legislative framework and of a proper strategy are 
judged to be the main cause for the failure of the process of privatization engaged 
by the international administration of UNMIK in Kosovo.
If neo-liberal theories praise privatization in general for its positive effects on 
socio-economic developments, the reality in Kosovo does not confirm these expec-
tations. Rather, major irregularities and a lacking strategy characterized the privati-
zation processes, which therefore resulted in a deterioration of the lives of Kosovars 
(S. Musliu, personal communication, 4 April 2015). This outcome is supportive for 
the institutionalist approach to privatization. It results in the plea to international 
organizations to ensure that the institutional context in a country is adequate be-
fore one starts such far-reaching processes as the privatization of major state-owned 
companies.
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